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Abstract. Inter-domain routing is a crucial part of the Internet de-
signed for arbitrary policies, economical models, and topologies. This
versatility translates into a substantially complex system that is hard
to comprehend. Monitoring the inter-domain routing infrastructure is
however essential for understanding the current state of the Internet and
improving it. In this paper we design a methodology to answer two sim-
ple questions: Which are the common transit networks used to reach a
certain AS? How much does this AS depends on these transit networks?
To answer these questions we digest AS paths advertised with the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) into AS graphs and measure node centrality,
that is the likelihood of an AS to lie on paths between two other ASes.
Our proposal relies solely on the AS hegemony metric, a new way to
quantify node centrality while taking into account the bias towards the
partial view offered by BGP. Our analysis using 14 years of BGP data
refines our knowledge on Internet flattening but also exhibits the con-
solidated position of tier-1 networks in today’s IPv4 and IPv6 Internet.
We also study the connectivity to two content providers (Google and
Akamai) and investigate the AS dependency of networks hosting DNS
root servers. These case studies emphasize the benefits of the proposed
method to assist ISPs in planning and assessing infrastructure deploy-
ment.
1 Introduction
Networks connected to the Internet are inherently relying on other Autonomous
Systems (ASes) to transmit data. To determine the path of ASes to go from
one place to another, the Internet relies solely on the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP). Computed AS paths are the result of an involved process that consid-
ers various peering policies set by each connected AS. BGP exposes only paths
that are favored by ASes hence concealing peering policies and the exact routing
process. However, as the connectivity of a network depends greatly on the con-
nectivity of the ASes it relies on, operators need a clear understanding of ASes
that are crucial to their networks. Identifying these AS interdependencies facili-
tates decisions for future deployments, local routing decisions, and connectivity
troubleshooting [17].
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In this paper, we aim at estimating the AS interdependencies from BGP
data. We devise a methodology that models ASes interconnections as a graph
and measure AS centrality, that is the likelihood of an AS to lie on paths between
two other ASes. We identify in Section 2 shortcomings of a classical centrality
metric, Betweenness Centrality (BC), when used with BGP data. From these
observations we employ a robust metric to estimate AS centrality, called AS
hegemony (Section 3). We demonstrate the value of the proposed method with
14 years of BGP data (Section 4). Overall we found that AS interdependencies
in IPv4 are decreasing over time which corroborate with previous observations
of the Internet flattening [3]. But we also found that the central role played
by tier-1 ISP is reinforced in today’s Internet. The Internet flattening for IPv6
is happening at a faster rate, but we found that Hurricane Electric network is
utterly central for the last 9 years. We also investigated the AS dependency of two
popular networks, Akamai and Google, showing that their dependency to other
networks is minimal although their peering policies are completely different.
Finally, we look at two networks hosting DNS root servers and show how recent
structural changes to these root servers have affected their AS dependencies.
We make our tools and updated results publicly available [1] hence network
operators can quickly understand their networks’ AS dependencies.
2 Background
Related Work: The essence of this work is the estimation of AS centrality
in AS graphs. In the literature AS centrality is commonly measured using Be-
tweenness Centrality (BC). This is one of the basic metric used to characterize
the topology of the Internet [18,12]. It was also applied for similar motivation
as ours. Karlin et al. [9] consider Internet routing at the country-level to inves-
tigate the interdependencies of countries and identify countries relying on other
countries enforcing censorship or wiretapping. BC is also used to identify critical
ASes for industrial and public sectors in Germany [17]. Similarly, Schuchard et
al. [15] select targets for control plane attacks using a ranking based on BC.
Finally, researchers have also applied BC to detect changes in the AS-topology.
For example, Liu et al. [11] employ BC to monitor rerouting events caused by
important disruptive events such as major earthquakes or sea cable faults. Fol-
lowing these past researches, we initially conducted our experiments using BC
but faced fundamental shortcomings due to the incomplete view provided by
BGP data. To introduce these challenges let’s first review BC.
Betweenness Centrality: BC is a fundamental metric that represents the
fraction of paths that goes through a node. Intuitively one expects high BC
scores for transit ASes as they occur on numerous AS paths, and low BC scores
for stub ASes. Formally, for a graph G = (V,E) composed of a set of nodes V
and edges E, the betweenness centrality is defined as:
BC(v) =
1
S
∑
u,w∈V
σuw(v) (1)
(a) Simple graph with three viewpoints (illustrated by
looking glasses). The sampled BC and AS hegemony
are computed only with best paths from the three view-
points, the expected BC is computed with all best paths.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of Betweenness Centrality (BC) and AS hegemony with a toy
example and BGP data
where σuw(v) is the number of paths from u to w passing through v, and S is
the total number of paths. BC ranges in [0, 1], but the relative magnitudes of
the scores are usually more significant than the absolute values.
Challenges: In theory, to compute BC one needs to know the set of all paths
in the graph. With BGP data, however, we are restricted to paths bounded to a
small number of viewpoints. We found that this singular type of path sampling
greatly impairs BC results. To illustrate this, we present an example in Figure 1a
with 13 ASes and three viewpoints. If we had viewpoints in all ASes, thus access
to all paths in the graph, we would obtain the highest BC score for the transit ISP
(.62) and lowest scores for the stub ASes (.15). But, using only paths bound to the
three viewpoints, the computed BC scores are substantially different (Sampled
BC in Fig.1a). Since about a third of the paths converge to each viewpoint, BC
values for ASes close to the viewpoints are undesirably high making these ASes
look more central than others. This bias is so pronounced that the BC for stub
ASes accommodating viewpoints (.38) is twice higher than the BC of one of
the regional ISP (.16). Although theoretical studies have already reported that
BC is significantly altered by sampling methods [10], this issue has been rarely
acknowledged in the networking literature. Mahadevan et al. [12] have reported
that BC is not a measure of centrality when computed with network data, but we
stress that this issue comes from the non-random, and opportunistic, sampling
method used to collect BGP data rather than the metric itself.
In our experiments we construct a global AS graph using all data from the
Route Views, RIS, and BGPmon project on June 1st 2016. This corresponds
to an AS graph of more than 50k nodes with 326 viewpoints (we consider only
full-feed BGP peers), and only 0.6% of all the AS paths on the Internet (16M
paths out of the 2.5B). As collected paths all converge to the 326 viewpoints,
ASes accommodating viewpoints and their neighboring ASes are seemingly more
central than other ASes. To measure the bias obtained with real BGP data
we conduct the following experiment. First, we compute the BC for all ASes
from all 326 viewpoints, then we compare this distribution of BC values to BC
values obtained with a smaller set of randomly selected viewpoints. The distance
between two distributions is measured with the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Figure 1b shows that changing the number of viewpoints invariably reshapes
the BC distribution, meaning that the obtained BC values are conditioned by
the number of viewpoints. From these results, we hypothesize that having more
than 326 viewpoints would yield different BC values thus the BC values obtained
with the 326 viewpoints might not be representative of AS centrality.
3 Methodology
To address the above BC shortcomings, we devise a monitoring method based on
a robust centrality metric called AS hegemony. The proposed method consists
of two basic steps. First we generate graphs from AS paths advertised via BGP.
Then, using AS hegemony, we estimate the centrality of each AS in the graphs.
We consider two types of graphs, global and local graphs. They different solely
by the scope of the modeled IP space.
Global graph: A global graph is made from all AS paths reported by the BGP
viewpoints regardless of the origin AS and announced prefix. Consequently, these
graphs represent the global Internet and central nodes stand for transit networks
that are commonly crossed to reach arbitrary IP addresses.
In 2017, IPv4 global graphs typically contains about 58k nodes and 188k
edges (about 14k nodes and 43k edges for IPv6). The structure of these graphs
is complex, yet they are valuable to monitor the Internet altogether and reveal
routing changes that have Internet-wide impacts.
Local graph: A local graph is made only from AS paths with the same origin
AS. Thereby, we compute a local graph for each AS announcing IP space glob-
ally. Each local graph represents the different ways to reach its origin AS and
dominant nodes highlight the main transit networks towards only this AS.
These graphs are particularly useful to monitor the dependence of an AS
to other networks. In addition, structural changes in local graphs can expose
important routing changes that are detrimental to the origin AS reachability.
AS Hegemony: The core of the proposed method is to quantify the centrality
of ASes in the generated graphs. To circumvent BC sampling problems we extend
the recently proposed AS hegemony metric [5]. This metric measures the fraction
of paths passing through a node while correcting for sampling bias.
Computing the hegemony of AS v from AS paths collected from several
viewpoints consists of the two following steps. First, AS paths from viewpoints
that are bias towards or against AS v are discarded. A viewpoint bias towards
AS v means that the viewpoint is located within AS v, or topologically very
close to it, and reports numerous AS paths passing through AS v. In contrast,
a viewpoint bias against AS v is topologically far from v and is reporting an
usually low number of AS paths containing v. Therefore, viewpoints with an
abnormally high, or low, number of paths passing through v are discarded and
only unbiased viewpoints are selected to compute the hegemony score.
Second, the centrality of v is computed independently for each unbiased view-
point and these scores are aggregated to give the final AS hegemony value. That
is, for each unbiased viewpoint j the BC of v (hereafter referred as BC(j)(v)) is
computed only from AS paths reported by j. And the average BC value across
all unbiased viewpoints is the AS hegemony score of v.
These steps can formally be summarized into one equation. Let n be the total
number of viewpoints, [.] be the floor function and 2α be the ratio of disregarded
viewpoints. The parameter 0 ≤ α < 0.5 represents the ratio of viewpoints that
are disregarded to compute the hegemony of an AS. Namely, we discard the
top [αn] viewpoints with the highest number of paths passing through the AS
and do the same for viewpoints with the lowest number of paths. Then the AS
hegemony is defined as:
H(v, α) = 1
n− (2[αn])
n−[αn]∑
j=[αn]+1
BC(j)(v) (2)
where BC(j) is the BC value computed with paths from only one viewpoint j
(i.e. BC(j)(v) = 1/S
∑
w∈V σjw(v)) and these values are arranged in ascending
order such that BC(1)(v) ≤ BC(2)(v) ≤ · · · ≤ BC(n)(v).
Figure 1a depicts the AS hegemony obtained for the simple graph with three
viewpoints (α = .34). Unlike the sampled BC, the AS hegemony is consistent
for each type of node: transit (H = 0.58), regional ISP (H = 0.25) and stub
AS (H = 0.08). AS hegemony scores are intuitively interpreted as the average
fraction of paths crossing a node. For example, on average a viewpoint has one
fourth of its paths crossing a regional ISP (H = 0.25).
As we did in Section 2 with BC, we compute from real BGP data the AS
hegemony using 326 viewpoints then we compare these results to those obtained
with a lower number of randomly selected viewpoints. Figure 1b shows that
the hegemony values with 20 or more viewpoints are very similar to the ones
obtained from all the peers, hence the AS hegemony is more robust than BC
to sampling. Note that we randomly select peers across different projects (e.g.
Route Views, RIS, BGPmon) to obtain a diverse set of viewpoints. Selecting
viewpoints from the same BGP collector usually yields poor results [5].
Paths’ Weights: We also extend AS hegemony to account for path disparities.
In a nutshell, we weight paths according to the amount of IP space they are
bound to. For example, a path to a /24 IP prefix represents a route to a smaller
network than a path to a /16 IP prefix, thus we give more emphasize to the path
towards the /16. However, the network prefix length alone is not sufficient to
resolve the IP space bound to a path. Internet address space deaggregation [2,6]
should also be taken into account. For example, a viewpoint reports the path
‘X Y Z’ for the prefix a.b.c.0/17 and the path ‘X W Z’ for the prefix a.b.0.0/16.
Meaning that BGP favors path ‘X Y Z’ for half of the advertised /16. In this
case there is no need to give more emphasis to the path bound to the /16 as
each path represents a route to 215 IP addresses.
Consequently, we modify our definition of BC to account for the size of the
IP space reachable through a path. Formally, σuw(v) is now the number of IP
addresses bound to the paths from u to w and passing through v. That is the
number of IP addresses represented by the advertised IP prefixes minus the
number of IP addresses from covered prefixes (i.e. deaggregated and delegated
prefixes as defined in [2]) that are not passing through v. In the rest of the paper
this weighted version of BC is applied for the calculation of AS hegemony in
IPv4, but as the relation between number of addresses and prefix size in IPv6
is more ambiguous we keep the classical BC definition for the calculation of AS
hegemony in IPv6.
4 Results
We have implemented the above methodology in Python and made our tools and
results publicly available [1]. Our implementation uses the BGPStream frame-
work from CAIDA [13] to fetch on the fly BGP data and then computes AS
hegemony of all ASes in the global graph as well as AS hegemony for ASes in
all local graphs. We set the parameter α = 0.1 for all experiments and verified
that results are consistent with higher α values.
Dataset: The following results are all obtained using BGP data from four BGP
collectors, two from the RouteViews project (route-views2 and LINX) and two
from the RIS project (rrc00 and rrc10). These four collectors are selected from
the collectors sensitivity results presented in [5]. For IPv4 they represent from
51 to 95 BGP peers respectively in 2004 and 2017. For IPv6, however, as the
number of BGP peers is rather small before 2007 (i.e. less than 10 peers) and AS
hegemony values might be irrelevant with such low number of peers (see Fig. 1b),
we report only results obtained from 2007 onward using from 11 to 44 peers. We
obtain Routing Information Base (RIB) files of all peers for the 15th of each
month from January 2004 to September 2017 and compute our methodology on
this dataset.
4.1 IPv4 and IPv6 global graphs
As the starting point of our analysis, we investigate the AS interdependency for
the entire IP space. We monitor the evolution of AS hegemony scores in the
global AS graph from 2004 to 2017. Here large AS hegemony scores represent
transit networks that are commonly crossed to reach arbitrary IP addresses.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the yearly average AS hegemony for all ASes
in the IPv4 and IPv6 global AS graphs. In these figures each point represent
an AS, and those on the right hand side of the figures stand for nodes with the
highest hegemony values.
As the distribution of AS hegemony values for IPv4 is overall shifting to
the left over time (Fig. 2a), we observe a global and steady decrease of AS
hegemony values. This is another evidence of Internet’s flattening [3], as networks
are peering with more networks we observe less dominant ASes. Nonetheless,
Figure 2a suggests that the AS hegemony for the most dominant networks (i.e.
points on the right hand side) is quite stable.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of AS hegemony for all ASes in the global graph.
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Fig. 3. AS hegemony for Tier-1 ISPs from 2004 to 2017 (global graph, IPv4).
We further investigate this by selecting the eight most dominant ASes found
in our dataset and monitor their yearly AS hegemony (Fig. 3). The AS hegemony
for these networks is indeed either steady, or increasing, which is contradictory
with the global Internet flattening observed earlier. These two observations pro-
vide evidences of dense connectivity at the edge of the Internet but the role of
large transit ISP is still very central to connect remote places in the Internet.
This can be explained by the growth of public peering facilities (IXP) that al-
lows local network to keep traffic locally and peer directly with content providers.
Yet transiting to remote locations requires the international networks of tier-1
ISPs. In recent years this distinction between tier-1 ISP and other networks is
event more visible, as we observe in Fig. 2a a clear gap between most networks
(H < 0.03) and tier-1 ISPs (H > 0.05).
Figure 3 also depicts the dominance of Level(3) through the entire study
period. After Level(3) acquisition of Global Crossing (AS3549) in 2011, it reached
in 2012 the highest AS hegemony score monitored for the IPv4 global graph
(H = 0.19). We also found that from 2008 to 2010 Global Crossing was the most
dominant AS in Level(3) local graph, meaning that it was the most common
transit network to reach Level(3). These results thus assert that Global Crossing
acquisition was the most effective way for Level(3) to attain new customers. It
also illustrates the benefits of our tools for deployment and business decisions.
For the IPv6 (Fig. 2b) we observe a faster Internet flattening than for IPv4.
We hypothesize that this is mainly because the Internet topology for IPv6 in 2007
was quite archaic. But IPv6 has drastically gained in maturity, the AS hegemony
distribution for IPv6 in 2017 is then very close to the one for IPv4 in 2009.
The most striking difference with IPv4 is the central role played by Hurricane
Electric in the IPv6 topology. After doubling its number of peers in 2009 [8],
Hurricane Electric has been clearly dominating the IPv6 space from 2009 onward.
It reaches an impressive AS hegemonyH = 0.46 in 2017, largely above the second
and third highest scores (0.07 and 0.05), respectively, for Level(3) and Telia.
Consequently, our tools confirm the dominant position of Hurricane Electric
observed previously [4] and permit to systematically quantify the overall IPv6
dependency to Hurricane Electric.
4.2 Case studies: Local graphs
Our analysis now focuses on results obtained with local graphs. Unlike the global
ones, local graphs shed light to AS dependency only for a specific origin AS. We
found that the structure of local graphs is very different depending on the size
and peering policies of the origin AS. On average in 2017, an IPv4 local graph
contains 98 nodes but 93% of these nodes have an hegemony null (H = 0). Typ-
ically ASes hosting BGP peers have an hegemony null and AS hegemony scores
increases as the paths converge towards the origin AS. Thereby, the upstream
provider of a single-homed origin AS gets the maximum hegemony score, H = 1.
By definition the origin AS of each local graph also features H = 1, therefore,
we are not reporting the AS hegemony of the origin AS in the following results.
In 2017, local graphs have on average 5 ASes with H > 0.01, which usually
corresponds to a set of upstream providers and tier-1 ASes. We also noticed
interesting graphs containing no dominant AS, and other graphs containing nu-
merous nodes with non-negligible AS hegemony scores. To illustrate this we pick
a local graph from both end of the spectrum, namely, AS20940 from Akamai
and AS15169 from Google.
Akamai and Google: The IPv4 graph for Akamai’s main network, AS20940,
is the local graph with the largest number of nodes in our results. In 2017,
it contains on average 30 nodes with an AS hegemony greater than 0.01 (see
Fig.4a). Meaning that accessing Akamai IP space relies on a large set of transit
networks. This is true for our entire analysis period as shown in Figure 4a.
Our manual inspection of Akamai BGP announcements reveals that Akamai
is heavily fragmenting its IP space and advertising small prefixes at various
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Fig. 4. Distribution of AS hegemony for Google and Akamai local graphs. Same color
scale as Fig. 2.
Points of Presence (PoPs). Consequently, each prefix is accessible only through
a very limited number of upstream providers and all BGP peers report AS paths
going through these providers. In summary, Akamai local graph contains a lot of
nodes with weak but non-negligible AS hegemony scores implying that Akamai
has numerous weak AS-dependencies.
On the other hand, the IPv4 graph for Google (AS15169) in 2017 contains no
node with an hegemony greater than 0.01 (see Fig. 4b). Our manual inspection
of Google BGP advertisements reveals that, unlike Akamai, Google announces
all their prefixes at each PoP. Because Google is peering at numerous places,
all BGP peers report very short and different AS paths with almost no AS in
common hence no relevant hegemony score. Nonetheless, Google’s local graphs
before 2012 feature a different AS hegemony distribution with a few high AS
hegemony scores (Fig. 4b). Level(3) is the most dominant AS observed until
2012. But then Google has clearly succeeded to bypass Level(3) and alleviate its
dependency to this AS (usually H < 0.00005 from 2014), hence now Level(3) is
rarely seen in paths towards Google. In summary, we observe that Google used
to depend on a few ASes but it is now mostly independent from all ASes. This
is not an isolated case, we have found a few other ASes with no AS dependency,
notably, Microsoft (AS8075), Level(3) (AS3356), Hurricane Electric (AS6939),
and Verisign (AS7342).
For IPv6, the situations for Akamai and Google is a bit different. The local
graph for Akamai contains a lot of nodes with a high AS hegemony (Fig.4c). But
Hurricane Electric is quite outstanding and features an AS hegemony (H = 0.43)
very close to the one observed for Hurricane Electric in the IPv6 global graph
(Fig. 2b). Hurricane Electric is also the dominant node in Google’s IPv6 local
graph (Fig. 4d) but at a much lower magnitude (H = 0.12). Thereby, our results
show that Google’s aggressive peering policy has partially succeeded to bypass
Hurricane Electric IPv6 network.
DNS root servers: Monitoring an AS with our tools provides valuable insights
into its AS dependency. This is particularly useful for networks hosting critical
infrastructure, as operators of these ASes try to minimize their dependencies to
third-party networks. To illustrate the benefits of our tools, we present results for
the local graphs of ASes hosting DNS root servers. Notice that understanding AS
dependency of root servers is usually a complicated task as most root servers are
using anycast and more than 500 instances are deployed worldwide. Due to space
constrains, we detail only IPv4 results for networks hosting the F-root (AS3557)
and B-root (AS394353) servers as they had significant structural changes in 2017.
In early 2017, we observe three dominant transit ASes for the network hosting
the F-root server (Fig. 5a). AS30132 and AS1280 are direct upstream networks
managed by ISC, the administrator of the F-root server. AS6939 is Hurricane
Electric, the main provider for AS1280, and is found in about a third of the
AS paths toward the F-root server. From March, Cloudflare (AS13335) starts
providing connectivity to new F-root instances [7]. This new infrastructure is
clearly visible in our results. Starting from March 2017, Cloudflare hegemony
is fluctuating around 0.2 and seems to divert traffic from other instances as
the three other transit networks have their hegemony proportionally decreased.
From these results we deduce that the addition of Cloudflare has successfully
reduced F-root dependencies on other ASes.
For the B-root server (Fig. 5b), we observe two dominant ASes in January
and February 2017, Los Nettos (AS226) and NTT America (AS2914). Los Net-
tos reaches H = 1 because at that time the B-root server was unicasted and Los
Nettos was the sole provider. NTT also has a very high AS hegemony score, in
fact more than 80% of analyzed AS path also cross NTT’s network. From March
2017, we observe two other transit nodes AMPATH (AS20080) and Hurricane
Electric (AS6939). Our manual inspection of the advertised paths reveals that
a single /24 prefix is advertised with AMPATH as the first hop. This prefix is
one of the two /24 prefixes advertised by the network hosting the B-root server
(AS394353) but is not the one containing the server IP address. We believe that
B-root operators were testing anycast in preparation for the deployment of the
second instance of B-root at Miami that happened in May [14]. In May we ac-
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Fig. 5. AS hegemony for nodes in F-root (AS3557) and B-root (AS394353) local graphs
from 15th January to 15th September 2017.
knowledge the deployment of the second instance hosted at AMPATH as the
hegemony of that AS is raising again and the one for Los Nettos had signif-
icantly decreased. From July onward, however, we observe a sudden decrease
of AMPATH hegemony while hegemony for Los Nettos is getting back close to
1. Therefore the addition of this second instance had uncertain benefits, first,
it considerably mitigated the dependence on NTT and Los Nettos networks in
May and June, but then, from July Los Nettos is once again totally dominating
the B-root connectivity.
Future directions: The structural changes observed for the F and B root
servers illustrate the value of AS hegemony to monitor significant routing events.
We are now designing an automated detection process to identify significant
changes in AS hegemony scores. This detector reports sudden routing changes
such as the recent BGP leak from Google [16]. During this event Google became a
transit provider for NTT OCN, which exhibits a sudden and significant increase
in Google’s AS hegemony for NTT’s local graph. Thanks to AS hegemony de-
tecting this type of event is fairly easy, while state of the art tools employed by
network operators (e.g. BGPmon provided by OpenDNS) have usually missed
this significant event. As the details and evaluation of this detector go beyond
the scope of this paper we leave this for future work.
In the future we are also planning to investigate different weighting schemes.
For example by assigning paths’ weight based on traffic volume an ISP can
emphasize destinations that are favored by its customers.
5 Conclusions
We presented a methodology to quantify the AS interdependency in the Internet.
It deals with the various AS paths reported via BGP and produce AS hegemony
scores, that are robust estimates of the ASes centrality. Using 14 years of BGP
data we proved that this method permits to monitor structural changes in the
Internet and identify most important ASes to reach a certain part of the IP
space. We also demonstrated with case studies the benefits of our tools to help
ISPs to plan and assess infrastructure deployment. To assist network operators
in these tasks we make our tools and results publicly available [1].
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